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I. INTRODUCTION
Though often overlooked, Indian tribes are the third sovereign
recognized in the United States' constitutional order.' A long and sordid historyof colonization resulted in tribes relinquishing much of their land, but only someof their aboriginal sovereignty. Indeed, the settled principle is that tribes possessall inherent powers that have not been expressly or necessarily abnegated by theirincorporation into the United States.2 The Supreme Court has found threelimitations on tribes: tribes cannot alienate their land, tribes cannot prosecute
* Associate Professor at Southern University Law Center (SULC). Managing Fellow ofSULC's Native American Law and Policy Institute. I would like to thank Peter Ortego, generalcounsel for the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, for his thoughtful comments on the paper. I would alsolike to thank Alison Geisler, my research assistant, for her work on the article.
I Sandra Day O'Connor, Remark, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33TULSA L.J. 1 (1997).
2 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("But until Congress acts, the tribesretain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects ofsovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of theirdependent status." (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978))).
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non-Indians, and tribes cannot engage in foreign relations 
without federal
approval.3 Accordingly, tribal sovereignty is 
akin to state sovereignty in that
states have those powers that were not surrendered to the 
federal government in
the Constitution' in contrast to the powers of municipal 
governments under
Dillon's Rule.
For the last 50 years, the United States has adopted a policy of tribal 
self-
government.6 The policy's goal is to free tribes 
from their dependence on federal
funds and allow tribes to build functioning economies on their 
land. Tribes have
made tremendous strides at self-determination; however, tribes still have 
a long
way to go. Economic transformation is the major lag in Indian 
country.7 Hardly
any privately-owned businesses operate in Indian country.
Several factors contribute to Indian country's economic despair, 
but state
taxation of Indian country commerce is the most severe 
impediment to tribal
economies. When states collect taxes on Indian country business 
transactions,
tribes are effectively barred from assessing taxes on the 
transactions because a
tribal tax on top of the states' would make the transaction 
more expensive.
Accordingly, tribes cannot levy taxes on commerce within 
their borders. This
means tribes are forced to fund their government operations 
through federal
grants and tribally-owned enterprises. In fact, 
businesses operating within Indian
3 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 
408, 426 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
5 Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868) ("[I]t must be taken 
for settled law, that
a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the 
following powers and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied 
or necessarily incident to the powers
expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to the 
declared objects and purposes of the
corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable; fourth, 
any fair doubt as to the existence
of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporation-against the 
existence of the power.").
6 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A RENEWED 
ERA OF FEDERAL-TRIBAL RELATIONS
5 (2017), https://obamawhithouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/whncaa 
report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/439W-
2QWH]; Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship
with Tribal Governments, PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004); Special Message to 
the Congress
on Indian Affairs, 1 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970).
7 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 2020) (defining "Indian country").




7 AM] ("There is not as much of a private sector
presence in Indian country, which tends to be high-poverty 
and high-unemployment to begin with."
(quoting Amber Ebarb, Nat'l Cong. Am. Indians)); 
Robert J. Miller, Creating Economic





6 38 ] ("Reservation economies rapidly lose the money that 
residents
receive because of the absence of small businesses where 
people can spend their cash on needed
goods and services.").
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country often require tribes to limit the amount of money they can receive based
upon the tax rate in the surrounding state.9
Tremendous economic injustice results from states imposing taxes
within tribal lands. Quil Ceda Village ("QCV") is the most outrageous example
of states picking tribal pockets. QCV was created by the Tulalip Tribes on the
tribe's land with virtually no assistance from the state or county government.10
Tulalip morphed a fruitless piece of land into a bustling commercial zone that
directly employs thousands of people and generates hundreds of millions of
dollars in regional economic impact." Despite minimal contributions to QCV,the State of Washington and Snohomish County collect over $40 million a year
in taxes from QCV.1 2 Tulalip collects none."
This Article discusses how tribal sovereignty is imperiled by theSupreme Court's current tribal tax jurisprudence. It begins by providing anoverview of tribal sovereignty and state taxing authority within Indian country.Next, this Article discusses the development of QCV and the court's affirmation
of state taxes at QCV. This Article then proposes two solutions to level the state-
tribal tax playing field. Option one is a clear rule prohibiting state taxes within
the boundaries of Indian country. Option two is allowing tribes to assess taxesoutside of their borders. While the former is preferable, the latter is fair under the
Supreme Court's current jurisprudence.
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TAxEs
Indian tribes existed as full sovereigns long before the arrival ofEuropeans.14 Tribes developed unique cultures and systematic laws in order to
9 See, e.g., Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1274 (D.N.M. 2009)("To the extent that they can do so without making other operators more attractive to the UMUT,the operators who negotiate leases and agreements with the UMUT take into account the cost ofthe five New Mexico taxes in reaching terms with the UMUT."), rev'dsub nom. Ute Mountain UteTribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011).




14 McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("It must always beremembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and thattheir claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government."); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.217, 218 (1959) ("Originally the Indian tribes were separate nations within what is now the UnitedStates."); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832) ("America, separated fromEurope by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations,independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, andgoverning themselves by their own laws."); Timothy R. Hurley, Comment, Elevating Form overSubstance at the Expense ofIndian Sovereignty [Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126
2020]
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facilitate commerce with other tribes.'
5 Therefore, Europeans acknowledged
Indian tribes as sovereigns by entreating with the tribes for trade and military
advantage.16 Upon its founding, the United States continued the European
tradition of recognizing Indian tribes as sovereigns." The United 
States entered
into treaties with Indian tribes-the constitutional mechanism for transacting
relations with separate sovereigns 
1 -and claimed commercial transactions
involving Indian tribes as an exclusively federal affair.'
9
States desired Indian lands and resources;
2 0 nonetheless, states knew
well they lacked the power to tax commercial activity occurring 
on Indian land.
S. Ct. 676 (2005)],46 WASHBURN L.J. 453, 459 (2007) ("Indians 
were exercising this power before
European settlers arrived in North America.").
1s Adam Crepelle, Decolonizing Reservation Economies: Returning 
to Private Enterprise and




3ZN ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
16 lan Paj er-Rogers, The Politics of Survival: Indian and 
European Collaboration in Colonial
North America, INQUIRY J. 3 
(2005),
https://scholars.unh.edu/cgiviewcontent.cgi?article= 008&context-inquiry2005i
[https://perma.cc/P5S2-SGW5] ("Thus, as Indian tribes and 
nations allied with various English
companies against other similar alliances, Indian nations were 
embarking on their own rudimentary
arms race."); Mike Scott, The 1718 Treaty That Saved a Native Louisiana Tribe, 
NOLA.COM, (Sept.
19, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.nola.com/300/article_714d8 
1 eb-ad51-5f7d-a9f6-
ef8f26 1 c5cee.html [https://perma.cc/75Z5-
7 Y7 9] (noting that the French signed a treaty with the
Chitimacha in 1718); The New World: A Stage for Cultural Interaction, 
TEACHINGHISTORY.ORG,
tt:: stcorg/to ntentk-a- onan/257 
https://perma.cc/XRT2-25
2 C]
("The Iroquois quickly signed an alliance and trade treaty with 
the English.") (last visited Feb. 29,
2020).
17 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 8; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
OF 1777, art. IX, para. 4
("regulating the trade and managing all affair with the 
Indians"); Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1
Stat. 50, 52 (1789) ("The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward 
the Indians. . . .").
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander 
Hamilton) ("They are not
rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements 
between sovereign and
sovereign."); Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARv. L. REv. F. 
93, 98 (2014) ("The
treaty power is a carefully devised mechanism for the federal 
government to enter into agreements
with foreign nations.").
19 See Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 
(codified as amended at
25 U.S.C.A. § 177 (West 2020)).




9T74]; Benjamin B. Tate, Wilson Lumpkin (1783-1870), 
NEw GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/govenment-politics/wilson-lumpkin-1783-1870
[https://perma.cc/28EE-3DFM] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) 
("In Lumpkin's eyes, however, his
major accomplishment was his cardinal role in the 
removal of the Cherokee Indians from north
Georgia.").
21 Scott A. Taylor, The Unending Onslaught on Tribal Sovereignty: 
State Income Taxation of
Non-Member Indians, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 917, 928 (2008) ("A 
review of early state tax laws shows
4
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Consequently, Georgia sought the extermination of the Cherokee Nation in aneffort to obtain the nation's wealth.22 The Supreme Court boldly denounced
Georgia's effort to extend its laws into the Cherokee Nation, declaring:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying
its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with
the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United
States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in
the government of the United States.2 3
The principle that state power stopped at the borders of tribal land was so well-established that even the Confederate States of America did not allow states totax tribes. Hence, the Supreme Court rejected state efforts to tax tribes in1867.2
Tribal sovereignty began to slide during the 1870s. Congress passedlegislation ending treaty-making with tribes in 187126 and moved towards apolicy of breaking up treaty-guaranteed reservations.27 The Supreme Court, for
no attempts to tax tribes... . [T]he states viewed Indian Country as a barrier to the exercise of statepower.").
22 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831) ("This bill is brought by theCherokee nation, praying an injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from the execution of certainlaws of that state, which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society,and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by theUnited States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.").
23 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
24 Taylor, supra note 21, at 932-33 ("This provision shows that the dominant legal paradigmof political separation for tribes continued in the Confederacy . . .. No Confederate states attemptedto tax tribes or activities within tribal boundaries.").
25 In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1866) ("Conferring rights and privileges onthese Indians cannot affect their situation, which can only be changed by treaty stipulation, or avoluntary abandonment of their tribal organization. As long as the United States recognizes theirnational character they are under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and theirproperty is withdrawn from the operation of State laws."); In re N.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.)761, 771 (1867) ("We must say, regarding these reservations as wholly exempt from State taxation,and which, as we understand the opinion of the learned judge below, is not denied, the exercise ofthis authority over them is an unwarrantable interference, inconsistent with the original title of theIndians, and offensive to their tribal relations.").
26 25 U.S.C.A. § 71(2018).
27 Dawes Act (1887), OUR DOCUMENTS,https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=50 [https://perma.cc/KWP9-Y73G]
(last visited Mar. 24, 2020) (noting the United States moved towards a policy of "breaking upreservations by granting land allotments to individual Native Americans" from 1870 to 1900).
2020]
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the first time, authorized state taxes within a reservation's boundaries in 
1885;
however, the Court affirmed the state tax because Congress had specifically
authorized state law to apply in the case.
28 Two years later, Congress passed the
General Allotment Act of 1887 ("GAA").
29 The GAA broke up reservations by
giving each Indian head of household 160 acres placed 
in trust for 25 years on
the theory that the Indian would own the land in fee simple, become a farmer,
and obtain American citizenship.
30
Although some proponents of the GAA were well-intentioned,
3 1 most
everyone knew it would result in the mass dispossession of 
the Indians. Indeed,
the driving force behind the GAA was to flood Indian lands with 
white settlers
in order to accelerate Indian assimilation.
33 The GAA was a roaring success at
opening Indian lands to settlers, as settlers ended 
up with 90 million acres of land
28 Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 32 (1885) ("By force of the 
cession thus made,
the land upon which the railroad and other property of the 
plaintiff are situated was, so far as
necessary for the construction and working of the road, and the construction and 
use of buildings
connected therewith, withdrawn from the reservation. The road 
and property thereupon became
subject to the laws of the Territory relating to railroads, as if the 
reservation had never existed.").
29 See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat, 388, 
repealed by Indian Land
Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 
§§ 101-103, 114 Stat. 1991, 1991-
2006 (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 2201 §§ 2201-2219 (West 2020)).
30 Id. § 6. ("[E]very Indian born within the territorial limits of the 
United States who has
voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and 
apart from any tribe of Indians
therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared 
to be a citizen of the United
States and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens 
. . . .").
31 WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 22 (6th 
ed. 2015) ("There is
little question that the leadership for passage of the Dawes Act came 
from those sympathetic to the






visited Feb. 14, 2020) ("The Friends of the Indians, an influential 
group of philanthropists and
reformers in the Northeast, believed that if individual Indians were given 
plots of land to farm,
they would flourish and become integrated into the American 
economy and culture as middle-class
farmers.").
32 Crepelle, supra note 15, at 436 ("The real aim of this bill is to 
get at the Indian lands and
open them up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent 
benefit of the Indians are but the pretext
to get at the lands and occupy them . . .. If this were done 
in the name of greed it would be bad
enough; but to do it in the name of humanity, and under 
the cloak of an ardent desire to promote
the Indian's welfare by making him like ourselves whether he 
will or not is infinitely worse."
(quoting Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry 
into Law, Policy, and History, 49 IDAHO
L. REv. 519, 524 (2013))).
33 Cass Cty. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103,106 (1998) ("The 
purpose
of the policy was to assimilate Indians into American society 
and to open reservation lands to
ownership by non-Indians."); Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992) ("The objectives of allotment 
were simple and clear cut: to
extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and 
force the assimilation of Indians
into the society at large."); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1984).
6
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that had been guaranteed to the Indians for all of time.3 4 Indians lost their mostvaluable land5 and suffered gross impoverishment due to the GAA. 3 6 The
mentality motivating the GAA also paved the way for extended state tax
authority within reservation boundaries."
Congress put an end to the GAA, as well as its assimilationist ideology,in 1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA").38 The IRA authorized therestoration of tribal land bases" and sought to reinvigorate tribal economies.4 0
However, the IRA's pro-Indian sentiment was short-lived as the United Statessought to terminate tribes following World War II until 1970.41 Significantly,Congress allowed states to expand their civil and criminal jurisdiction into Indiancountry, but Congress expressly forbade state taxation of tribal lands.42 In 1965,the Court acknowledged the United States' long held policy of leaving Indians
34 CANBY, supra note 31, at 23-24.
3 Id. at 24 ("Of the 48 million acres that remained, some 20 million were desert orsemidesert.").
36 LEWIS MERIAM, INST. FOR Gov'T RESEARCH, TiH PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 3(1928) ("An overwhelming majority of the Indians are poor, even extremely poor. . . .").n See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); see also Truscott v. Hurlbut Land & Cattle Co.,73 F. 60, 64 (9th Cir. 1896) ("We are unable to see any good reason why the authority of the state,and its subordinate subdivisions, the counties, may not also include the taxation of all such personalproperty found within their geographical limits, although upon the reservation in question,provided, as in this case, the Indians, are in no way interested in it."); Torrey v. Baldwin, 26 P.908, 912 (Wyo. 1891) ("The county of Fremont had in the year 1889 full right, power, and authorityto assess for taxation and levy a tax upon the cattle and horses of the plaintiff which were duringall that year kept and located upon the Shoshone Indian reservation.").
38 The Indian Reorganization Act-75 Years Later: Renewing Our Commitment to RestoreTribal Homelands and Promote Self-Determination: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on IndianAffairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman, S. Comm. On IndianAffairs) ("When Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, its intent was very clear.Congress intended to end Federal policies of termination and allotment and begin an era ofempowering tribes by restoring their homelands and encouraging self-determination."); CANBY,supra note 31, at 25 ("The Indian Reorganization Act was based on the assumption, quite contraryto the Allotment Act .)... ); Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Actofl934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955, 955 (1972) ("A major reversal of governmental policy and approachtoward Indian affairs was effectuated by the IRA.").
39 Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified asamended at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5121 (West 2020)).
40 See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) ("The intent and purpose ofthe Reorganization Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance todevelop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism."' (quoting H.R. REP.No. 1804, at 6 (1934))); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974) ("The overridingpurpose of that particular Act was to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able toassume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically.").
41 CANBY, supra note 31, at 27.
42 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(b) (West 2020); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(b) (West 2020).
2020]
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"free from state interference" when holding that states cannot 
tax non-Indian
businesses operating on a reservation with federal approval.
By the 1970s, the political branches of the United States 
government had
eschewed termination of favor of tribal self-determination-which 
continues to
be the United States' Indian policy.44 On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court
became less protective of tribal sovereignty in the late 1970s. The Supreme
Court has sharply circumscribed tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
on
questionable legal and historical grounds.
46 Contrarily, the Supreme Court has
all but abdicated Justice Marshall's clear rule that state power 
ends where the
reservation begins.47 This jurisdictional inversion has caused 
tremendous
troubles for tribes on a myriad of fronts.
48 Nowhere are the troubles more
profound for tribes than in the realm of taxation. While tribes 
retain the ability to
tax non-Indians engaged in commerce on the tribe's reservation,
49 the tribal tax
power is greatly curtailed.
For example, the Supreme Court held in 2001 that the Navajo Nation
could not tax a non-Indian-owned hotel operating within the 
tribe's reservation
because the hotel happened to be on a tiny patch of fee simple 
land.0 The Court
acknowledged that the Navajo Nation provided vital services to the hotel," and
interestingly, the Court had previously admitted states provide virtually 
no
43 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 686-87 (1965).
44 See, e.g., supra notes 38-39.
45 Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CoNN. L. REv. 
1055, 1057
(1995) ("Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating 
in the last decade, however, the decisions of the
Supreme Court more frequently countenance expanding state 
authority in Indian country by
limiting the historic scope of tribal authority in Indian country.").
46 See Adam Crepelle, Lies, Damn Lies, and Federal Indian 
Law: The Ethics of Relying on
Racist Precedent in Contemporary Federal Indian Law, 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
(forthcoming 2020).
47 Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 
251, 257
(1992) ("The 'platonic notions of Indian sovereignty' that guided 
Chief Justice Marshall have, over
time, lost their independent sway."); United States v. 
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 997 (10th Cir.
2011); Chavez v. Navajo Nation Tribal Courts, No. CV 11-601 
LFG/KBM, 2011 WL 13174514,
*2 (D.N.M. Sept. 14, 2011), aff'd, 465 F. App'x 813 (10th Cir. 
2012).
48 See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989) (allowing states to zone fee land within an Indian 
reservation).
49 Merion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); 
Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) 
("The power to tax transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or 
its members is a fundamental attribute
of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by 
federal law or necessary implication
of their dependent status.").
so Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001).
5 Id. at 654-55.
8
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services on the Navajo Reservation.5 2 If the tribe wants to fund the governmental
services it provides to non-Indians, the Court stated the tribe should bill the non-Indians for the services rather than tax them. Due to allotment, manyreservations are heavily "checkerboarded"-alternating tracts of privately-owned non-Indian fee and tribal trust land.54 Tribes are largely powerless onparcels of non-Indian fee land located on the tribe's reservation."
The Supreme Court has all but shattered the once mighty tribal armoragainst state taxation. Tribal and individual Indian trust land remain beyond statetaxation.56 Income earned by an Indian on her tribe's reservation is also exemptfrom state taxation. Other than this, the Supreme Court gives states near carteblanche to tax any transaction-from sales to oil and gas production-on triballand that involves a non-Indian.58 The Supreme Court has authorized state taxeson non-Indian businesses operating on a reservation so long as the state assertsit provides the scantest of services on the reservation.59 In the Supreme Court'sview, the tribe is not impacted by state taxes of tribal commerce provided the
52 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965) ("Congress has,since the creation of the Navajo Reservation nearly a century ago, left the Indians on it largely freeto run the reservation and its affairs without state control, a policy which has automatically relievedArizona of all burdens for carrying on those same responsibilities.").
s3 Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 655 ("Although we do not question the Navajo Nation's ability tocharge an appropriate fee for a particular service actually rendered, we think the generalizedavailability of tribal services patently insufficient to sustain the Tribe's civil authority overnonmembers on non-Indian fee land.").
54 Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 502 (1979)("In short, checkerboard jurisdiction is not novel in Indian law, and does not, as such, violate theConstitution.").
5s Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
56 Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,458 (1995) ("Taking this categoricalapproach, we have held unenforceable a number of state taxes whose legal incidence rested on atribe or on tribal members inside Indian country."); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508U.S. 114, 123 (1993) ("But our cases make clear that a tribal member need not live on a formalreservation to be outside the State's taxing jurisdiction; it is enough that the member live in 'Indiancountry.' Congress has defined Indian country broadly to include formal and informal reservations,dependent Indian communities, and Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust by theUnited States.").
57 McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
58 When an Indian is on a reservation for a tribe other than the one she is enrolled in (forexample, a Navajo on the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana Reservation), the Indian is a treated as anon-Indian for tax purposes. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville IndianReservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980).
59 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 185-87 (1989) (affirming a NewMexico tax on reservation oil production by a non-Indian company though New Mexico providedless than $90,000 worth of services but collected over $2,000,000 in taxes during the oilproduction).
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"legal incidence" of the tax falls upon a non-Indian.
6 0 Moreover, the Supreme
Court requires tribes to comply with state recordkeeping requirements 
and
collect and remit taxes to the state.
6 1 The Supreme Court has even offered states
suggestions on how to impose taxes within tribal lands.
6
Tribes' only chance of preventing an outside sovereign from imposing
taxes within their borders is an interest balancing test crafted by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court performs "a particularized inquiry into 
the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed 
to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority 
would violate
federal law."63 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that tribal interests 
are less
important than state or federal interests;
64 hence, the Court has required extreme
federal entanglement in tribal matters in order to oust state taxes.
6 ' Even federal
regulations the Supreme Court has described 
as "all-inclusive"
66 are not
60 Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); 
Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. at 458 ("The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian 
tax cases, therefore, is who
bears the legal incidence of a tax."); Cal. Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi 
Tribe, 474 U.S. 9, 12
(1985) ("We hold that the legal incidence of California's 
cigarette tax falls on the non-Indian
consumers of cigarettes purchased from respondents smoke shop, and that petitioner 
has the right
to require respondent o collect the tax on petitioner's behalf.").
61 Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 
61, 73 (1994); Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. at 160-61; Moe v. Confederated Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
62 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 460 ("And if a State is unable to 
enforce a tax because the
legal incidence of the impost is on Indians or Indian 
tribes, the State generally is free to amend its
law to shift the tax's legal incidence."); Millhelm Attea & Bros., 
512 U.S. at 72 ("We explained
that alternative remedies existed for state tax collectors, such as damages 
actions against individual
tribal officers or agreements with the tribes."); Okla. Tax Comm'n 
v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi
Tribe, 498 U.S 505, 514 (1991) (advising states on how to circumvent tribal sovereign 
immunity
in order to collect taxes on tribes).
63 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
64 McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("Finally, 
the trend has been
away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as 
a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance
on federal pre-emption.").
65 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 46 U.S. 324, 338 
(1983) ("Furthermore, the
exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction in this case would completely 
'disturb and disarrange,' the
comprehensive scheme of federal and tribal management established pursuant 
to federal law.");
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 841-42 
(1982) ("The direction and
supervision provided by the Federal Government for 
the construction of Indian schools leave no
room for the additional burden sought to be imposed by the State through its taxation 
of the gross
receipts paid to Lembke by the Board."); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148 
("In these circumstances we
agree with petitioners that the federal regulatory 
scheme is so pervasive as to preclude the
additional burdens sought to be imposed in this case.").
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sufficient to keep state taxes out of Indian country.67 At present, self-sufficient
tribes have essentially no chance at preventing states from taxing commercial
activity the tribes have created within their borders. This is loudly evinced bythe federal district court's 2018 decision in Tulalip Tribes v. Washington.69
III. QUIL CEDA VILLAGE-A NEW LEVEL OF INJUSTICE
This Part provides an overview of the most outrageous state effort to tax
tribal enterprise in the United States' history. It begins by discussing the historyof QCV. Then it turns to the legal challenge surrounding the state and county's
taxes on QCV.
A. History of QCV
The Tulalip Tribes are the heirs of various tribes, including theSnohomish, Snoqualmie, and Skykomish, who signed the Treaty of Point Elliot
in 1855.70 Life was hard for the Tulalip after the treaty.71 Things began to change
for the better when the Tribe adopted a governance structure that was approvedby the United States in 1936.72 A portion of the Tribes' land was used as amilitary training ground during the Second World War, but the Tribes regained
control over their land postbellum.73 The Tribes gained greater control over theirland by having Congress pass the Tulalip Leasing Act of 1970.74
Economic destitution was common amongst the Tribes' citizens until the
Indian gaming boom.75 Tulalip was one of the first tribes in Washington to enter
the gaming arena. Tremendous success was instantaneous; however, Tulalip
67 Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. at 61 (concluding that the Indian Trader Statutes the Courthad previously held up as "all-inclusive" are not in conflict with New York's tax laws).
68 Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of Federal IndianPolicy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 200 (2017) (noting that when tribes exercise greater control, courtshave been less willing to rule in favor of tribes).
69 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
70 About Us, TULALIP TRIBES, https://www.tulaliptribes-nsn.gov/WhoWeAre/AboutUs 
(lastvisited Mar. 24, 2020).
Id. (For example, tribal children were taken from their parents and forced to attend boardingschools from 1857 through 1932.).
72 Id
73 Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 1051.
74 25 U.S.C.A. § 415(b) (West 2020).
7 Quil Ceda Village, ASH CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE & INNOVATION, HARV.
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was leery of hanging its future solely on gaming.
77 Tulalip believed its location
would make an ideal site for a business park.
78 Pursuant o federal law,
79 Tulalip
created the second federal city in the United States--Quil Ceda 
Village
("QCV"), with Washington, D.C., being 
the other.80 This means QCV is a
political subdivision of Tulalip.
81
Tulalip built QCV from scratch on a formerly isolated and 
unproductive
tract of land.8
2 Throughout the entire planning process, Tulalip applied 
its
traditional values to design QCV and engineer a unique experience.
8 3 Tulalip and
the federal government built a road to QCV.
84 Tulalip and QCV built and
continue to maintain QCV's roads, water systems, fiber optic lines, an electrical
substation, natural gas lines, and all other physical infrastructure within 
QCV."
All emergency services within QCV are provided by Tulalip 
and QCV.86 Federal
and tribal bureaucracy usually scares businesses away from tribal 
lands, but
QCV has created an environment conducive 
to the private sector.
8 8 A once
desolate parcel now employs thousands of people 
and generates hundreds of
millions dollars in economic activity annually thanks 
to Tulalip's vision and
effort.89 Remarkably, Tulalip does not collect any 
tax revenue from the
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 26 U.S.C.A. § 7871 (West 2020).
80 Quil Ceda Village, supra note 75.
81 Id.
82 Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs Tulalip Tribes, 
Tulalip Tribes and Quil Ceda Village
Defend Right to Tax Tribal Economic Development, 
TULALIP TRIBES (June 12, 2015),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/quil-ceda-sales-tax-filingpress-release.pdf.
83 Quil Ceda Village, supra note 75 ("The Tulalip 
Tribes selected the Village location in order
to protect the natural, cultural, and rural character of the reservation's undeveloped 
twenty-one
thousand acres. Moreover, the Tribes have carefully supervised 
the Village's design so that it
would reflect tribal values. During early planning stages, the 
Tribes adopted a holistic approach to
the environment and set aside substantial land within the Village for a park, 
trails, and a wetland.").
84 Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 
1051 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (noting the
tribe provided 76% of the funding for the road to QCV, the federal government 
provided 19%, and
Washington provided 5%).
85 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 7:14-22, 
Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d
1046 (No. 2:15-cv-00
9 4 0); Quil Ceda Village, supra note 75.
86 Quil Ceda Village, supra note 75.
87 Crepelle, supra note 15, at 159-64; Adam Crepelle & 
Walter E. Block, Property Rights and
Freedom: The Keys to Improving Life in Indian Country, 23 WASH. & LEE J. 
Civ. RTs. & Soc.
JUST. 315, 326 (2017) (discussing the bureaucratic impediments that stand in 
the way of tribal
economic development).
88 Quil Ceda Village, supra note 75.
89 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
1:23-2:3, 2:15-21, Tulalip Tribes, 349 F.
Supp. 3d 1046 (No. 2:15-cv-009
4 0).
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municipality it created.90 QCV is currently funded by land lease payments from
tenants and other business ventures owned by Tulalip.91
B. The Tax Showdown at QCV
Though neither the state nor county made notable contributions to thecreation of QCV, both now want to tax it-and do. By the State of Washington's
own admission, the state and county collect tens of millions of dollars in taxesfrom QCV each year.92 In 2015, Tulalip and QCV filed a suit to enjoin thesetaxes on the basis that Tulalip and QCV are responsible for the creation,maintenance, and continued success of QCV and provide all of the essential
government services at QCV.93 Tulalip and QCV argued the state and county
taxes prohibit the tribe from assessing taxes that would be used to fundgovernmental services at QCV. 94 The ability to tax, according to Tulalip andQCV, is essential for Tulalip to become self-sufficient.9 5 Indeed, the United
States agreed with Tulalip's view on the tax situation at QCV and intervened onbehalf of Tulalip, asserting: "In imposing taxes on Quil Ceda sales, services, andbusiness activities, the State and County seek to raise revenues from activities
that cost them nothing, and over which they exercise no control." 9 6 Both the Stateof Washington and Snohomish County answered contending they providevaluable services to QCV.9"
The federal court sided with the state and county in 2018. At the outset
of its opinion, the court noted, "the right to tax does not merely fall to the partywhose interests are greatest, or that has provided the most value in government
services to the taxpayers at issue."98 It stated the legitimacy of the state and localtaxes turned on whether federal law had preempted the state tax.99 The court
90 Id. at 21:13-14 ("Plaintiffs do not currently implement or enforce these taxes with respect toany non-Tribal businesses in the Village.").
91 About Us, supra note 70 (describing consumer retail and commercial leasing opportunities).
92 Defendant Vikki Smith's Answer & Affirmative Defenses at 2:9-11, Tulalip Tribes, 349 F.Supp. 3d 1046 (No. 2 :15-cv-00940).
9 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3:11-13, Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d1046 (No. 2 :15-cv-00940).
94 Id. at 3:3-7.
95 Id. at 2:24-3:3.
96 United States' Complaint in Intervention at 20:3-6, Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046(No. 2:15-cv-00940).
9 Defendant Vikki Smith's Answer & Affirmative Defenses 13:3-5, Tulalip Tribes, 349 F.Supp. 3d 1046 (No. 2:15-cv-00940); Answer of Defendants Snohomish County, Sievers, &Portmann to Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 25:16-23, Tulalip Tribes, 349 F.Supp. 3d 1046 (No. 2 :15-cv-00940).
98 Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 1050.
9 Id at 1050-51.
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acknowledged that QCV is predominantly a Tulalip project with a healthy dash
of federal assistance.1
00 The court concluded that the state and county collected
over $40 million in taxes from QCV in 2015 in addition to 
the tens of millions it
had collected in the years before.' The court also acknowledged 
that QCV had
its own taxes that it could not impose due to the state and county 
taxes.10 2
The court began its legal analysis by weighing the federal 
interests
involved in QCV and made clear that greater federal entanglement 
in the tribal
endeavor increased the likelihood of preempting the state 
taxes.103 The United
States argued it had an interest in Tulalip's economic development 
and self-
sufficiency as set forth in numerous federal laws; moreover, 
the United States
provided over $50 million to help create QCV.
104 However, the court found the
federal interest in QCV minimal because:
The United States does not make or even review managerial
decisions at the businesses located within Quil Ceda Village, let
alone day to day operations. The federal government does 
not
set prices, or regulate advertising, or decide what 
goods should
be sold at QCV, or impose infrastructure requirements, or
oversee employment decisions, or regulate the import of goods
from off the reservation, or require approval of contracts.
10 5
Absent such federal involvement, the court surmised federal interest in 
QCV
must be low.
Tulalip and the United States both argued the Tulalip Leasing Act
demonstrated a strong federal interest in promoting economic 
development at
Tulalip.10 6 The court determined the Tulalip Leasing Act peeled 
away the federal
regulations that thwart economic development in much of 
Indian country by
granting Tulalip greater control over its reservation 
lands.107 Bizarrely, the court
concluded that the federal government's empowering the tribe cleared the way
for state and county taxes.o On top of this, the court claimed the Tulalip Leasing
Act only involved leasing; therefore, the state and county 
sales taxes did not
impact any federal interest in QCV obtaining leases.
109 Accordingly, the court
100 Id. at 1051-52.
101 Id. at 1052.
102 Id. at 1053.
103 Id. at 1054.
104 Id. at 1051.
105 Id. at 1055.
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concluded that there was no significant federal interest in QCV,"o and whatever
federal interest there may be, the state and county taxes did not impact QCV's
ability to lease land."'
Turning to tribal interests, the court recognized Tulalip's sovereign
interests in economic development.12 QCV helped reduce Tulalip's
unemployment rate from over 70% during the 1970s to roughly 6%, and the court
admitted this was a result of the Tribes' own initiative."' However, the courtrejected the Tribes' argument that QCV's value stems largely from theapplication of Tulalip's cultural philosophy.14 The court also asserted the taxwas not on QCV itself but on the products sold at QCV." 5 Based upon this andTulalip not micromanaging the businesses at QCV, the court held Tulalip hadonly a slight interest in barring state and county taxes."16
The court was able to identify only one state and county interest involved
at QCV: "raising revenue."' 1 The court claimed the key inquiry was "whetherthe taxes being challenged are justified by provision of services to thetaxpayers.""8 Ceding that QCV and Tulalip provide all essential services atQCV, the court stated Washington and Snohomish County also assert they
provide services to QCV patrons.'119 In particular, the court pointed out thatWashington spent $20 billion on education between 2015 and 2017.120 Thissealed the deal for the court as it declared, "[w]ithout question, all operations atQuil Ceda Village derive substantial, critical benefits from the high-quality
public education Washington provides."'2 1 The state and counties have othergovernment operations that are available to those who frequent QCV; thus, the
1o Id
I Id at 1057 ("The taxes do not interfere with or in any direct, measurable sense reduce thelease payments the Tribes will continue to collect from businesses at QCV, or other revenuescollected from Indian-run businesses within the Village, which Defendants established at trial aresubstantial.").
112 Id. at 1058.
'1 Id
114 Id
115 Id. at 1059.
116 See id
117 Id at 1060.
11s Id (citing Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177, 1199 (10th Cir. 2011)).
1' Id
120 Id
121 Id at 1061.
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court determined the state and county have a 
powerful interest in taxing QCV.
122
Accordingly, the court upheld the state and county taxes on QCV.
12 1
IV. PROBLEM WITH STATE TAXATION OF INDIAN COUNTRY
Allowing states to tax commerce occurring on tribal lands greatly
undermines tribal sovereignty. Courts are worried that tribes 
will serve as little
more than tax dodges if state taxes are barred from Indian country.
124 According
to the Supreme Court, the ability to offer lower tax rates gives 
tribes "an artificial
competitive advantage."
1 25 However, states routinely use lower tax rates 
and
other incentives to attract businesses to their jurisdictions.
126 The Supreme
Court's rationale for treating tribes differently than states 
appears to be that the
Court thinks tribes are lesser sovereigns.
127 This explains why the Court allowed
122 Id. at 1060--62 (listing funding for education, 
emergency medical services, road
maintenance, as well as providing law enforcement officers, 
access to 911, and Search and Rescue
resources as reasons for the court's decision that the counties 
both "provide a substantial portion
of services that support Quil Ceda Village and the Tulalip reservation").
123 Id. at 1063.
124 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 
447 U.S. 134,
155 (1980) ("We do not believe that principles of 
federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of
pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, 
authorize Indian tribes thus to market an
exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere."); 
Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Arizona, 50 F.3d 
734, 738 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Arizona's
ability to tax these sales precludes the Community from creating 
a tax haven at the mall." (citation
omitted)).
125 Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 155; see also 
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kooteni
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976) (discussing "the competitive 
advantage which the Indian seller
doing business on tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette 
retailers" which would otherwise go
"virtually unchecked"); Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 
1186 (9th Cir.
2008) ("Because the Tribe, as part of its highly lucrative 
gambling enterprise, merely marketed a
sales tax exemption to non-Indians as part of a calculated 
business strategy, we conclude that its
strategic effort to receive construction services from non-Indians at a 
competitive discount by
circumventing the state sales tax does not outweigh California's interest in raising 
general funds
for its treasury.").
126 See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, WHY 




Amy Sullivan, How Citibank Made South Dakota the Top State 
in the U.S. for Business, ATLANTIC
(July 10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2 013/07/how-citibank-made-south-
dakota-the-top-state-in-the-us-for-business/4
2 566 1/ [https://perma.cc/2GFA-QND4] ("But when
state leaders, desperate to attract outside businesses during the economic 
recession of the early
1980s, changed South Dakota's usury laws to eliminate the cap on interest 
rates and fees, Citibank
came calling."); Motion Picture Production Program, 
LA. ENTERTAINMENT,
https:/louisianaentertainment.gov/film/motion-picture-production-program
[https://perma.cc/2YJG-4EYY] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
127 See David Y. Kwok, Taxation Without Compensation as a Challenge 
for Tribal Sovereignty,
84 Miss. L.J. 91, 121 (2014) ("To some extent, it may be unfair that 
states, particularly the
16
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Kansas to levy taxes that fell upon a tribe despite Kansas providing tax
exemptions for transactions involving other sovereigns.128 Likewise, courts
compel tribes to collect and remit taxes to states without any compensation,
essentially solidifying tribes' status as little more than tributaries. 129 Tribal
sovereignty has been demoted from a starring role to a mere "backdrop" in the
Supreme Court's interest balancing test.13 0
The Supreme Court's interest balancing test thoroughly ignores tribes'
interest in being self-sufficient. A minimal state interest tips the scales in favor
of the state unless the federal government is immensely enmeshed in the tribal
operation at issue,13' and even still, massive federal involvement may not be
sufficient to outweigh state interests in taxing tribal commerce.13 2 Accordingly,the court in Tulalip claimed that more tribal freedom from federal regulation
meant there was more room for state taxes.13 3 This, of course, is entirely illogical.
Since 1970, the executive and legislative branches have sought to create self-
reliant tribal governments. In the words of the Supreme Court, "[t]he power to
tax members and non-Indians alike is surely an essential attribute of such self-
government; the Navajos can gain independence from the Federal Government
only by financing their own police force, schools, and social programs."'34
Nonetheless, the court in Tulalip described the Tribe's interest in collecting taxes
at QCV-which Tulalip built and provides all of the traditional government
services for-as "little more than financial"'35 and the state's ability to tax QCV
as "a legitimate state interest."13 6
geographically smaller ones, can compete for local retail customers on the basis of reduced salestax, while tribes do not have a similar right.").
128 See Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 119 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting) (noting Kansas exempts transactions "to any other state or territory or to any foreigncountry" from its fuel tax along with "sale or delivery ... to a contractor for use in performingwork for the United States").
129 Kwok, supra note 127, at 93 ("[S]tates are allowed to force uncompensated tribal retailersto collect taxes on the state's behalf." (citing. Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros,512 U.S. 61, 71 (1994))).
130 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
131 See, e.g., id.; Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837-38 (1982).But see New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338 (1983).
132 See generally Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989) ("Thus,although the federal and tribal regulations in this case are extensive, they are not exclusive .... ).133 Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1056 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
134 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1985) (citation omitted).135 Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 1063.
136 Id. at 1060 (quoting Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (9thCir. 2008)).
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Courts assert, however, that tribes are not being taxed by 
states if the
"legal incidence of the tax" falls upon the non-Indian 
purchasers. 13 What courts
mean by "legal incidence" is that the tax is paid by whoever the statute obligates
to pay the tax.138 The legal incidence can be determined by 
simply having the
legislature declare that the tax's incidence ultimately 
falls upon the consumer.
3 9
Courts have admitted the obvious-legal incidence is 
not the equivalent of
economic reality.14 0 State taxes-regardless of who bears 
the legal incidence-
impact the price of goods in Indian country, and 
this impacts consumer behavior
137 Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 
U.S. 95, 110 (2005) ("For the foregoing
reasons, we hold that the Kansas motor fuel tax is a nondiscriminatory 
tax imposed on an off-
reservation transaction between non-Indians."); Erik M. Jensen, 
Taxation and Doing Business in
Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REv. 1, 57 (2008) ("If the legal 
incidence of a state tax associated with
events inside Indian country falls on a tribe or tribal 
member, the tax is likely to be invalid. In
contrast, if the legal incidence falls on a nontribal member, 
the tax is likely to be valid, even if the
tax has arguably disastrous economic effects for the tribe.").
138 Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation v. 
Gregoire, 658 F.3d 1078,
1084 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The 'legal incidence' of an excise tax refers to determining 
which entity or
person bears the ultimate legal obligation to pay the tax to 
the taxing authority."); Sac & Fox Nation
v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 578 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he legal incidence 
of a tax falls upon the entity
or individual necessarily responsible for paying the tax under the taxing statutes."); 
Squaxin Island
Tribe v. Stephens, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255-56 (W.D. 
Wash. 2005) ("[T]o discern where the
legal incidence lies, we ascertain the legal obligations imposed 
upon the concerned parties, and
this inquiry does not extend to divining the legislature's true economic object. 
Further, a party does
not bear the legal incidence of the tax if it is merely a transmittal agent for 
the state tax collector."
(quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674 
(9th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations
omitted))).
139 Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,460 
(1995) ("And if a State is unable
to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of the impost 
is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State
generally is free to amend its law to shift the tax's legal incidence."); Wagnon, 
546 U.S. at 102
("We have suggested that such 'dispositive language' from the 
state legislature is determinative of
who bears the legal incidence of a state excise tax." (quoting Chickasaw Nation, 
515 U.S. at 102
(1995))).
140 Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 384 F.3d at 681 ("The person or 
entity bearing the legal incidence of
the tax is not necessarily the one bearing the economic burden." 
(citation omitted)); Squaxin Island
Tribe, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 ("The person or entity bearing 
the legal incidence of the tax is not
necessarily the one bearing the economic burden." 
(quoting Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 384 F.3d at
681)); Barona Band, 528 F.3d at 1189 ("The party bearing 
the legal incidence of a state tax may
well differ from the party bearing the economic burden 
of that tax.").
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss3/12
TAXES, THEFT, AND INDIAN TRIBES 1017
in Indian country.141 Therefore, state taxes alter Indian country's economic
environment and affect tribes' ability to exercise their sovereign right to tax.14 2
If both the state and tribe tax the same transaction, double taxation
occurs. Justice Ginsburg has recognized the problem created by states taxing
tribal transactions noting:
As a practical matter . . . the two tolls cannot coexist. If the
Nation imposes its tax on top of Kansas' tax, then unless the
Nation operates the Nation Station at a substantial loss, scarcely
anyone will fill up at its pumps. Effectively double-taxed, the
Nation Station must operate as an unprofitable venture, or not at
all. 143
Courts do not permit double taxation in the state or international arena due to theharms it causes.144 Nevertheless, courts permit double taxation within Indian
141 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 21:19-22:1, Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp.3d 1046 (No. 2 :15-cv-00940); Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence (Dep't of Econ., Tufts Univ.,Working Paper 2006-07), http://ase.tufts.edu/economics/papers/200607.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HY36-M5DS] ("Economic incidence differs from statutory incidence because ofchanges in behavior and consequent changes in equilibrium prices."); Gerald Prante & AndrewChamberlain, Economic vs. Legal Incidence: Comparing Census Bureau Figures with TaxFoundation Tax Burdens, TAX FouND. (June 9, 2006), https://taxfoundation.org/economic-vs-
legal-incidence-comparing-census-bureau-figures-tax-foundation-tax-burdens/
[https://perma.cc/9TAG-LWJ2] ("Because taxes influence the relative prices facing individuals,they lead to changes in individual behavior. These tax-induced changes in behavior cause someportion of the economic burden of taxes to be shifted from those bearing the legal incidence ontoothers in society.").
142 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); Washington v.Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980); Mark J. Cowan,Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem andAnalyzing the Role ofthe FederalGovernment in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 PIr. TAX REV. 93, 94 (2005) ("Inother cases, business in Indian country may be double taxed (by both the tribal and stategovernments), creating disincentives to invest in reservation business ventures."); Jesse K. Martin,Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation: Undermining Indian Sovereignty Through StateTaxation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 251, 252 (2006) ("The bona fide factthat the off-reservation imposition of the tax on the distributor affects tribal members, because thedistributor is economically forced to push the tax downstream, highlights the inequities that existin the prerequisites to the Bracker interest-balancing test.").
143 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
144 Clinton, supra note 45, at 1210-11 (citations omitted) ("In the context of the dormantinterstate Commerce Clause, multiple state taxation often is avoided by the constitutionalrequirement of reasonable apportionment or the necessity for one state to afford credit for like taxespaid in another state."); Cowan, supra note 142, at 94 ("The present tax system thus createsinequities that would never be tolerated in the multistate or international tax arenas."); Richard D.Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX LAW.897, 908 (2010) ("The Indian tax cases tolerate results that would violate the Interstate CommerceClause.").
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country leaving tribes with a choice: assess a tax on top of 
the state tax and make
transactions in Indian country more expensive than outside 
of Indian country or
forgo assessing taxes and collect no tax revenue 
for government operations.
Either way, tribes lose. Federal law already creates a dense 
bureaucratic
environment that increases the cost of doing business in Indian country.
14 6
Adding an extra tax reduces a business's profitability 
and scares away even the
most adventurous investor.
14 7 Alternatively, tribes can opt not to tax business
occurring on their land. This means tribes have no tax revenue 
to fund roads,
police, courts, and other basic necessities.
14 8 The Supreme Court has admitted
tribes suffer economic harm from state taxes on Indian country commerce, 
but
the Supreme Court has simply shrugged its shoulders.
14 9
States claim they use the taxes generated within Indian country 
to benefit
Indian country, but the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged 
that states do not
provide significant value to reservations.
1 50 This is pellucid. Indian country has
145 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP'T OF THE 
INTERIOR, ADDRESSING THE HARMS OF DuAL
TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY THROUGH MODERNIZING 
THE INDIAN TRADER REGULATIONS 1-2
(Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/39%20-
%2 0Ewiiaapaayp%2OBand%20of/o2OKumeyaay%20Indians%20%20 
0f/ 2O4 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6F6-QFSJ] [hereinafter BIA, ADDRESSING 
THE HARMS]; Cowan, supra note
142, at 99 ("Where the double tax problem exists, tribes 
are forced to choose between self-
government and economic development.").
146 Crepelle, supra note 15; Crepelle & Block, supra note 87, at 5.
147 Cowan, supra note 142, at 95 ("Businesses, already discouraged 
from operating on Indian
reservations because of a lack of infrastructure or the uncertain application 
of commercial law, are
further chilled by the potential for simultaneous tribal and state taxation."); 
Hurley, supra note 14
(citations omitted) ("If the Nation attempted to collect 
both taxes, its business would be reduced to
nothing.").
148 BIA, ADDRESSING THE HARMS, supra note 145, at 
1 ("Or, tribes collect no taxes and suffer
inadequate roads, schools, police, courts and health care.").
149 See Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 
95, 114 (2005) ("But the Nation
cannot invalidate the Kansas tax by complaining about 
a decrease in revenues." (citations
omitted)); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 
(1989) ("It is, of course,
reasonable to infer that the New Mexico taxes have 
at least a marginal effect on the demand for
on-reservation leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, 
and the ability of the Tribe to increase
its tax rate."); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 151 (1980) ("Such a tax may be valid even if it 
seriously disadvantages or eliminates the
Indian retailer's business with non-Indians.").
150 Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 129 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The 
record reveals a different reality.
According to the affidavit of the Director of the Nation's Road 
and Bridge Department, Kansas
and its subdivisions have failed to provide proper maintenance even 
on their own roads running
through the reservation. As a result, the Nation has had to assume 
responsibility for a steadily
growing number of road miles within the reservation (roughly 118 
of the 212 total miles in 2000).
Of greater significance, Kansas expends none of its fuel tax 
revenue on the upkeep or improvement
of tribally owned reservation roads." (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted)); Cotton Petroleum
Corp., 490 U.S. at 189 ("Cotton's most persuasive argument 
is based on the evidence that tax
payments by reservation lessees far exceed the 
value of services provided by the State to the
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a dire shortage of police,5 ' the worst roads in the United States,15 2 and 48% ofIndian country households lack basic water infrastructure.53 States have notaddressed these decades-old problems. Instead, states take revenue generated
inside Indian country and spend the money on state services outside of Indian
country.5 4 Indians are the poorest group in the country,'55 continue to face state-
lessees, or more generally, to the reservation as a whole." (citations omitted)); Warren TradingPost Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1965) ("Congress has, since the creation ofthe Navajo Reservation nearly a century ago, left the Indians on it largely free to run the reservationand its affairs without state control, a policy which has automatically relieved Arizona of allburdens for carrying on those same responsibilities. And in compliance with its treaty obligationsthe Federal Government has provided for roads, education and other services needed by theIndians.").
151 Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno Indians v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th Cir.2013) ("State governments, including California, appear to have done no better than the federalgovernment in funding law enforcement in Public Law 280 jurisdictions and, as a result, AmericanIndians in Public Law 280 states consistently report that state law enforcement is unavailable orslow to respond." (citations omitted)); STEWART WAKELING ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 9 (2001),https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/188095.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4NV-B5UY] ("[T]he figuresare roughly equivalent to an area the size of Delaware, but with a population of only 10,000 that ispatrolled by no more than three police officers (and as few as one officer) at any one time-a levelof police coverage that is much lower than in other urban and rural areas of the country."); EricLichtblau, California Shorted on Tribal Funding, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1999, 12:00 AM),http://articles.latimes.com/19 99 /oct/28/news/n-i-27258 [https://perma.cc/28DH-M6CM]
(discussing the underfunding of tribal law enforcement in California, a mandatory PL 280 state,and state law enforcement's neglect of reservations).
152 See POLICY RESEARCH CTR., NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, INVESTING IN TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF IMPACT AND REMAINING NEED UNDER THE AMERICAN RECOVERYAND REINVESTMENT ACT 2 (2010), http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-
publications/InvestinginTribalGovenmentsAnAnalysisofARRA.pdf 
(noting that mostjurisdictions receive $5,000 per road mile while Indian country receives $500 per road mile).153 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON NAT. RES., WATER DELAYED IS WATERDENIED: How CONGRESS HAS BLOCKED ACCESS TO WATER FOR NATIVE FAMILIES, executivesummary (Oct. 10, 2016), http://blackfeetnation.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/House-NRC-
Water-Report-Minority-10-10-16.pdf ("Over a half million people--nearly 48% of tribal homes--in Native communities across the United States do not have access to reliable water sources, cleandrinking water, or basic sanitation.").
154 BIA, ADDRESSING THE HARMS, supra note 145, at 1 ("To add insult to injury, reservation
economies are funneling millions of tax dollars into treasuries of state and local governments whospend the funds outside of Indian country.").
155 SUZANNE MACARTNEY ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY RATES FOR SELECTED GROUPSDETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE AND PLACE: 2007-2011 3 (2013),https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2013/acs/acsbrl I-1 7.html [https://perma.cc/E2T5-
TVZC] ("By race, the highest national poverty rates were for American Indians and Alaska Natives(27.0 percent) and Blacks or African Americans (25.8 percent).").
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imposed barriers to voting,156 and are a small minority.
15 7 States have no political
incentive to serve Indian country;' in fact, the Supreme Court 
has noted, "the
people of the states where they are found are 
often their deadliest enemies.
The inability to tax forces tribes to start businesses 
to fund their
governments.16
0 Few people realize that tribal casinos are not 
like their non-
Indian counterparts. Federal law mandates that tribal casino revenue can 
only
fund the following: the tribal government, the general welfare of tribal 
citizens,
tribal economic development, charity, or, sardomically, 
non-Indian
governments.16' Federal law requires tribes 
to compact with states in order to
engage in Vegas-style gaming.
162 Though states cannot tax the tribe itself, states
can refuse to compact with tribes if the tribe will not turn 
over a portion of its
revenues, and tribes have no remedy if the state acts in bad 
faith.'66 Tribes have
no such power to stop states from allowing casinos to 
open adjacent to their
reservations. States do what they can to pick tribal pockets 
in other tribal ventures
as well, 164 and courts generally let them do it.
Out of all the injustices tribes have suffered at the hands 
of states in
modern times, QCV is the worst. Tulalip took a formerly 
unproductive tract of
land on its reservation, planned, and built QCV without assistance 
from the state.
Tulalip recruits and regulates the tenants at QCV. It maintains 
the infrastructure
and provides all the essential services at QCV. By the 
court's own admission,
QCV is no tax haven.
165 QCV is clearly providing value; otherwise, patrons
would not drive to QCV to purchase items easily available online with same-day
156 Anna Smith, 5 Obstacles for Native Voters in the November 
Election, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.hen.org/articles/tribal-affairs-5-obstacles-for-native-voters-in-the-
november-election [https://perma.cc/G2YA-4FLD].
157 Profile: American Indian/Alaska Native, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH 
& HUM. SERV. OFF. MINORITY
HEALTH, https:/minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lv1=3&lvlid=62
[https://perma.cc/W6G4-BMZW (last visited Mar. 29, 
2020).
158 See Adam Crepelle, Concealed Carry to Reduce Sexual 
Violence Against American Indian
Women, 26 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 236, 243 (2017) ("Because 
Indians are usually minorities
within their jurisdiction, state abuses of authority are 
common in PL 280 states, as there is little
political incentive for states to appease Indian country populations.").
159 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
160 See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit 
of Tribal Economic Development as a
Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REv. 
759 (2004) (discussing how tribes limited
ability to tax forces tribes to pursue alternative sources of revenue 
such as business development).
161 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(2)(B) (West 2020).
162 Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
163 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
16 Lance Morgan, The Rise ofTribes and the Fall ofFederal Indian 
Law, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115,
121 (2017) ("In the tribal economic area, the core 
dispute is often with the powers federal Indian
law has granted to the states. The states use this power to directly and 
indirectly control tribes.").
165 Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 
1063 n.7 (W.D. Wash. 2018).
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delivery.1 66 Rather than rewarding Tulalip for creating a regional economic
engine from scratch, the court used QCV's financial success as justification forstate taxation.16 7 This was not the first time tribal economic well-being wasweaponized as rationale for state taxes.'6 8 The deck is clearly stacked againsttribes. The playing field needs to be leveled.
V. SOLUTIONS
Tribes face an uphill battle when it comes to exercising their sovereign
right to tax. An easy way to resolve the issue is barring state taxes within Indiancountry. If tribes want a state service, the tribe can pay for the service. The other
solution is to allow tribes to levy taxes beyond their borders. This would becomplicated, but it would be fair based upon the Supreme Court's current Indiantax jurisprudence.
A. State Power Stops at the Reservation's Edge
The easiest way to end double taxation is by invoking a bright line rule:state taxing authority ends where Indian country begins. Indian affairs were
originally intended to be an exclusively federal matter.16 9 To this very day, the
United States has a direct government-to-government relationship with Indian
tribes.' The federal government's Indian policy since 1970 has been to foster
166 Even the food options at QCV can be easily accessed through apps such as GrubHub, Waiter,and Doordash.
67 Tulalip Tribes, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 1063 ("[TJhere is no evidence in the record that the Stateand County collection of taxes here has impeded the Tribes' ability to thrive financially." (citationomitted)).
168 Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Moreover,as noted with the related tribal interest, our concern with self-sufficiency necessarily lessens in thespecific context ofa multi-million dollar casino expansion.").
69 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832) ("The treaties and laws of the United Statescontemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide thatall intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union."); GeorgeWashington Address to Seneca Indians, Dec. 29, 1790,https://pages.uoregon.edu/mjdennis/courses/hist469_senecas.htm 
[https://perma.cc/F384-8PQR]
("The general Government only has the power, to treat with the Indian Nations, and any treatyformed and held without its authority will not be binding.").
170 Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 2009 DAILY COMP. PREs. Doc. 00887 (Nov. 5, 2009),https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-200900887/pdf/DCPD-200900887.pdf
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tribal self-determination and economic development.
17 1 President Reagan said
creating "healthy reservation economies" 
involves tribes, the federal
government, and private business-he did not mention 
the states.172 Reducing
tribal dependence on federal funds is a core objective of federal 
Indian policy.17 1
The ability to tax is imperative to the fulfillment 
of these objectives. 
17  State
taxation of commerce within Indian country subverts federal 
Indian policy;
moreover, state taxes of Indian country commerce 
are unconstitutional.
State taxation of Indian country economic activity 
violates the Indian
Commerce Clause; in fact, the Constitution was 
structured to grant the federal
government exclusive authority over Indian 
affairs.17 5 According to the plain text
of the Constitution, commercial dealings with Indian tribes are 
an exclusively
federal matter.
176 The Supreme Court originally utilized the text 
of the
Commerce Clause to prevent states from meddling 
with tribal affairs,
17 and the
171 Alysa Landry, Richard M Nixon: 'Self-Determination 
Without Termination', INDIAN
COUNTfRY TODAY (Sept. 13, 2016), htp:idacutyoa~omaciercadmnxnself-
deetiainwtottriainKBPyZGkYOS- 
[https://perma.cc/TG6U-
Y47X] ("Nixon's Indian policy followed weaker attempts 
by presidents John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson to end termination, said Carole Goldberg, 
a law professor at the University of
California, Los Angeles. While Kennedy and Johnson 
both prioritized social programs that
benefited Indians (along with other marginalized populations), 
they failed to recognize the special
relationship between tribes and the federal government.").
172 Statement on Indian Policy, I PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983).
17 3 Id.
174 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, n.5 
(1982) (McKay, J., concurring) (quoting
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 550 (10th 
Cir. 1980)) ("It simply does not make
sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal functions 
approved and mandated by Congress
without being able to exercise at least minimal taxing powers, whether 
they take the form of real
estate taxes, leasehold taxes or severance taxes.").
175 Gregory Ablavansky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 
1050-51
(2015) ("The interpretation with the best claim to be the original 
understanding of the federal
Indian affairs power was based on a structural interpretation 
of the Constitution; it read multiple
provisions in tandem to preclude state authority over 
Indian affairs."); Clinton, supra note 45, at
1245 ("The constitutional grant of exclusive federal authority 
over such matters contained in the
Indian Commerce Clause completely preempted the exercise of any 
state authority in this area.").
176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
177 United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 
93 U.S. 188, 194 (1876) ("Congress now
has the exclusive and absolute power to regulate commerce 
with the Indian tribes-a power as
broad and as free from restrictions as that to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations. fth
Accordingly, treaties have been made and laws passed 
separating Indian territory from that of the
States, and providing that intercourse and trade with 
the Indians should be carried on solely under
the authority of the United States."); In re Kan. Indians, 
72 U.S. 737, 755 (1866) ("If under the
control of Congress, from necessity there can be no divided 
authority."); United States v. Holliday,
70 U.S. 407, 418 (1866) ("It follows from these propositions, 
which seem to be incontrovertible,
that if commerce, or traffic, or intercourse, is carried 
on with an Indian tribe, or with a member of
such tribe, it is subject to be regulated by Congress, 
although within the limits of a State. The
[Vol. 122T A M7 D VYrPW
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United States recently asserted the Indian Commerce Clause was intended toprohibit states from regulating commerce with Indian tribes.17 1 Therefore, state
levies within Indian country contravene the Indian Commerce Clause,
particularly when the tribe is already taxing the transaction.17 9
Unfortunately for tribes, the Indian Commerce Clause no longer has its
origial and straightforward meaning. In a double taxation case, the Supreme
Court rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as a shield against state taxes ofIndian country commerce.1 80 The Supreme Court instead asserted, "the central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenarypower to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.""' This interpretation of theIndian Commerce Clause was rejected by the Court over a century ago 82 and isentirely ahistorical.18 3 Thus, the Indian Commerce Clause is no longer an aegisagainst state encroachment into tribal commerce. Now the Indian Commerce
locality of the traffic can have nothing to do with the power."); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515,557 (1832).
178 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *22, Ramah-Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureauof Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (No. 80-2162) ("The Indian Commerce Clause assigns to theNation, rather than the States, responsibility for Indian affairs, including the intercourse betweenIndians and non-Indians."); Brief for the United States at *25, Washington v. Confederated Tribesof the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (No. 78-630) ("The analysis is simplythat the Constitution itself- as exemplified in the Indian Commerce Clause - ousts State jurisdictionover all matters within Indian Reservations that significantly touch tribal interests and reserves thatarea for federal regulation."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at * 12, Cent. Mach. Co.v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980) (No. 78-1604) ("But, as it happens, the specifichistory of the Indian Commerce Clause itself confirms its purpose to nationalize white-Indianrelations and wholly to exclude State authority to regulate that intercourse.").
179 Cowan, supra note 142, at 130-31 ("If such double taxation resulted from the imposition oftwo state taxes on the same transaction, it would be struck down as a burden on interstate commerceunder the Interstate Commerce Clause.").
Iso Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) ("The extensive case lawthat has developed under the Interstate Commerce Clause, moreover, is premised on a structuralunderstanding of the unique role of the States in our constitutional system that is not readilyimported to cases involving the Indian Commerce Clause. Most notably, as our discussion ofCotton's 'multiple taxation' argument demonstrates, the fact that States and tribes have concurrentjurisdiction over the same territory makes it inappropriate to apply Commerce Clause doctrinedeveloped in the context of commerce 'among' States with mutually exclusive territorialjurisdiction to trade 'with' Indian tribes.").
181 Id
182 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886).
183 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I cannot agreethat the Indian Commerce Clause 'provide[s] Congress with plenary power to legislate in the fieldof Indian affairs.' At one time, the implausibility of this assertion at least troubled the Court. "(citations omitted)); Ablavansky, supra note 175, at 1081 (noting the plenary power doctrine wasnot born of the Constitution's text but of "military and diplomatic conquest" as well as the "rise ofa racialist paradigm that denigrated Native peoples and their claims to nationhood").
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Plenary power, however, is Congress's to exercise;
185 accordingly,
Congress can end double taxation in Indian country.
1 86 In addition to having an
official policy of tribal self-determination, Congress 
has trust and fiduciary
duties to tribes that are furthered by barring state taxes of Indian 
country.87
Congress has considered proposals to address state 
taxation of Indian country
enterprise,18 8 and Congress already provides tax breaks 
related to work in Indian
country.1 89 When the Department of the Interior 
proposed amending Indian
trader regulations,
19 0 the public comments overwhelmingly named double
taxation as the primary impediment to Indian country 
economic development.
1 9 1
184 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968-69 (2016) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) ("And,
until the Court rejects the fiction that Congress possesses plenary 
power over Indian affairs, our
precedents will continue to be based on the paternalistic 
theory that Congress must assume all-
encompassing control over the 'remnants of a race' for its own 
good." (citing Kagama, 118 U.S.
at 384)); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON 
72 (2005) ("Significantly, the plenary
power doctrine was generated directly out of the principles 
of white racial superiority affirmed by
the Marshall model's originating precedents in a series 
of major nineteenth-century Supreme Court
decisions that followed the Marshall Trilogy."); Robert 
N. Clinton, There-Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 113, 238 (2002) ("Such careful 
scrutiny reveals the
intellectual bankruptcy of the federal Indian plenary power doctrine. Kagama 
clearly indicated that
the basis of the federal Indian plenary power doctrine 
was not the Indian Commerce Clause nor
any textual delegation of constitutional power to Congress, 
but rather, a late-nineteenth century
'white man's burden' argument for colonialism derived from notions 
of racial superiority then
prevalent in the western drive for colonial empires.").
185 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 
800 (2014) ("We ruled that way for a
single, simple reason: because it is fundamentally Congress's job, not ours, to determine 
whether
or how to limit tribal immunity."); Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. 
Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1990) ("In
light of these concerns, we decline to revisit our case law 
and choose to defer to Congress.").
186 Pomp, supra note 144, at 1221 ("With a stroke 
of the pen, Congress could intervene and
change the rules of the game, but has shown little 
inclination in doing so.").
187 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176 (2011) 
("The Government,
following 'a humane and self imposed policy . .. has 
charged itself with moral obligations of the
highest responsibility and trust."' (quoting Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-
97 (1942))).
188 Robert William Alexander, The Collision of Tribal 
Natural Resource Development and State
Taxation: An Economic Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REv. 387, 419 
(1997) ("The recently enacted IERA
authorizes establishment of a commission to, among other things, 'develop 
proposals to address
the dual taxation by Indian tribes and States of 
the extraction of natural resources on Indian
reservations."'); Cowan, supra note 142, at 140 (noting 
Congress considered "a federal income tax
credit for dual taxes paid in Indian country").
189 26 U.S.C.A. § 45A (West 2020); id. § 168(j).
190 25 U.S.C.A. § 177; see also 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 261-264; 25 C.F.R. § 140.1-26 
(2020).
191 Identifying Economic Priorities in Indian Country, Tribal Consultation, Albuquerque, 
NM,
BUREAU INDIAN AFS., Aug. 
17, 2017, at 42,
htp:/w~i~o/ie/i~po~pno~bcodcmfle/sesa-arc/d/817-
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Commentators have called for Congress to end state taxation of Indian country
as well.192 Several states also have provisions in their enabling acts that prohibit
them from taxing Indian lands.1 93 Congress should rebuke the Court and enddouble taxation.
Politics will likely stand in the way of Congress aiding the tribes.
Congress represents the states and not the tribes, and states often oppose tribal
interests.9 4 Tribes are currently struggling mightily to urge Congress to passlegislation that recognizes their inherent sovereign right to prosecute people whorape Indian women on reservations.'95 One can hardly imagine the political
resistance tribes will face when trying to stop state taxation.196 However, the data
may be able to help sway Congress because tribal economic development
undeniably benefits states.197
17.Albuquerque%20NM%20Transcript Indian%20Traders%2025%20CFR%20140.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6CU-GXHWI] [hereinafter Albuquerque Transcript]; Indian TraderRegulations, Tribal Consultation, Salamanca, N.Y, BUREAU INDIAN AFFS., Aug. 28, 2017, at 25,https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia_prod.opengov.ibmeloud.com/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/08-28-
1 7 .Salamanca%20NY%2OTranscriptIndian%2oTraders%2025%20CFR%20140.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AGD6-SCMP] ("[B]ut our tribes know that the issue that has greatest economicimpact is this issue of state taxation and dual taxation."); NAT'L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, PROPOSAL
To AMEND THE INDIAN TRADER REGULATIONS TO SUPPORT TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION INBUSINESS REGULATION AND TAXATION (2016) http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/economic-
development-commerce/BroadcastANPR on IndianTrader Regs.pdf ("Most importantly, theregulations should eliminate dual taxation.").
192 Alexander, supra note 188, at 419-20 ("As advocated in this Article, the better regime, i.e.,one that enhances tribal self-government and economic development, would forbid states to taxprivate resource developers on reservations, whether or not tribes themselves tax the developers.");Anna-Mane Tabor, Sovereignty in the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15 U. FLA. J.L.& PUB. POL'Y 349, 402 (2004) ("Ultimately, however, a legislative solution is needed to restorefull tribal tax power.").
93 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 190n.23 (1980) (listing cases involving state enabling acts that prohibit state authority over Indianlands).
94 Crepelle, supra note 15, at 449-50.
195 Jourdan Bennett-Begaye, Senate VA WA Bill Undercuts Tribal Sovereignty, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY (Nov. 22, 2019), https://newsmaven.io/indiancountrytoday/news/senate-vawa-bill-
undercuts-tribal-sovereignty-p51xqJzSSUqSnbKKMTVB9A/.
196 Cowan, supra note 142, at 148 ("[T]he states would fiercely oppose a preemption bill.Preemption does not help out congresspersons themselves and would not score them any majorpolitical 'points' that would aid in reelection.").
197 KELLY S. CROMAN & JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, WHY BEGGAR THY INDIAN NEIGHBOR? THE
CASE FOR TRIBAL PRIMACY IN TAXATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY 14 (2016),http://nni.arizona.edu/application/files/8914/6254/9090/2016_Croman whybeggar thyIndian_
neighbor.pdf ("Tribal economic development adds directly to gross state product when it bringsunderutilized resources into production; tribal land, infrastructure, natural resources, and otherphysical capital are put to higher and better use."); SUSAN JOHNSON ET AL., NAT'L CONFERENCE OFSTATE LEGISLATURES, GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT MODELS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES
2020]
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Even if Washington and Snohomish County did 
not collect a cent in
taxes at QCV, QCV is a massive benefit for the 
region because it creates
thousands of jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars a year in economic 
impact
on what was formerly an unproductive piece of land.
198 Non-Indians fill most of
the jobs at QCV and spend their money 
off of the reservation.
199 The state can
tax non-Indian wages and the off-reservation purchases from QCV 
employees.
Thus, the state reaps rewards from an endeavor 
it had no part in building and has
. . 200
no role in maintaining. Countless other examples 
exist of tribal economic
success aiding states.
2 0 1
The most equitable solution is to have tribes purchase 
state services if
tribes want state services. Indeed, this is the biggest 
point of contention-states
and counties claim to be providing valuable services 
to Indian country while
tribes contend they do not.
20 2 States can simply shut off services to Indian
country. If the tribe needs a state service, the tribe can 
pay for it. If the tribe does
not need the service, the state can simply cease 
expending resources in Indian
country. Several states and tribes have already entered 
into tax agreements.
20 3
Barring state taxation as a baseline simply levels the 
bargaining power between
tribes and states.204 Besides, states offer tax breaks and incentives to companies
AND TRIBES 4-5 (2009), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/statetribe/2009_govtOgov.pdf
(discussing how tribal economic development benefits 
states).
198 See supra Part III.
199 See supra Part III.
200 See supra Part III.
201 KAREN J. ATKINSON & KATHLEEN M. NILLES, OFFICE OF INDIAN 
ENERGY & EcoN. DEV.,
TRIBAL BUSINESS STRUCTURE 
HANDBOOK 1-1 (2008),
https://permanent.accesS.gpo.gov/lpsl
2 54 8/tribal-business-structure-handbook.pdf ("In many
parts of the country, Tribes are becoming regional economic and 
political power houses. They are
the largest employer in many counties."); Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher & Leah Jurss, Tribal
Jurisdiction-A Historical Bargain, 76 MD. L. REv. 593, 
594 (2017) ("Modem Indian nations are
serious economic players in many parts of the United 
States and are often the largest and most
stable employers in large swaths of regional territories.").
202 Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177, 1207 
(10th Cir. 2011) (Lucero, J.,
dissenting) (noting "New Mexico provides no on-reservation 
services to the Ute Mountain Ute or
to oil and gas companies"); BIA, ADDRESSING THE HARMS, 
supra note 145, at 1 ("To add insult to
injury, reservation economies are funneling millions 
of tax dollars into treasuries of state and local
governments who spend the funds outside of Indian country.").
203 Cowan, supra note 142, at 133 ("In the tax arena, over 
200 tribes have entered into compacts
with over eighteen states.").
204 Hurley, supra note 14, at 463 ("Kansas, however, 
refused to renew the compact with the
Nation in 1995, following the Supreme Court's decision 
in Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Chickasaw Nation." (citations omitted)).
28
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 122, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss3/12
TAXES, THEFT, AND INDIAN TRIBES 1027
all the time.205 States should, at minimum, treat tribes as well as they treatcorporations.
If Congress does not act, the Court can overturn its precedent. The Court
has previously made courageous stands in affirming Indian rights, most
famously, Chief Justice John Marshall's reprimand of Georgia for infringing
upon the rights of the Cherokee.206 Deep respect for tribal sovereignty has beenexpressed by two of the Supreme Court's newer Justices, Sonia Sotomayor207
and Neil Gorsuch.208 Justice Thomas has also expressed discontent with thecurrent state of Indian law, in particular, the Court's racist, paternalistic, andahistorical reading of the Indian Commerce Clause.209 Perhaps this trio caninspire their colleagues to end the unjust practice of double taxation in Indian
country.
Barring state taxation within Indian country is the easiest solution to theunjust practice of dual taxation. It simplifies business transactions, willencourage Indian country economic development, and will enable tribes to usetax revenue to fund their governments. This will permit tribes to become self-sufficient, thus furthering the federal government's avowed Indian policy for thelast 50 years. Moreover, ending state taxation of Indian tribes is the moral thingto do. The history of the United States is largely one of plundering tribalresources.2 10 State taxation of Indian country economic development is acontinuation of this ignoble American tradition. It needs to end. Making
205 Lauren Feiner, Amazon Will Get Up to $2.2 Billion in Incentives for Bringing New Officesand Jobs to New York City, Northern Virginia and Nashville, CNBC.coM (Nov. 13, 2018, 10:46AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/13/amazon-tax-incentives-in-new-york-city-virginia-and-
nashville.html; Krystal Hu, Apple Still Got 'Generous' Tax Breaks, Without Clear Job CreationPlans, YAHOO! FINANCE (Dec. 16, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/apple-still-got-
generous-tax-150234375.html; Chris Marr, Google's $13B Expansion Boosted by Millions in TaxIncentives (1), BLOOMBERG TAX (Feb. 14, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-
tax-report-state/googles- 3b-expansion-boosted-by-millions-in-tax-incentives-1.
206 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) ("Rendering one of his most courageous andeloquent opinions, Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia's assertion of power was invalid."(referencing Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832))).
207 See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 804 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,concurring).
208 See Wash. State Dep't of Licensing v. Cougar Den Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019)(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
209 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring);United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); United States v. Bryant,136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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reservation boundaries impenetrable bulwarks 
against state taxes stops further
depredation of tribes.
B. Tax 'Em Back
The other, and much less desirable, solution to state 
taxation of Indian
country economic activity is allowing tribes to tax 
economic activity that occurs
outside of Indian country. Retaliatory tariffs are 
authorized under international
law, and tribes attempting to level the tax 
playing field with states fits the
retaliation mold.
2 1 1 Furthermore, the same rationale that supports 
state taxes
within Indian country support assessing tribal taxes outside 
of Indian country.
Courts have upheld state taxes on Indian country 
economic activity because
states create an environment that facilitates Indian country 
commerce.2 12 Using
tribal casinos as but one example, tribes clearly create 
value that draws people to
their lands.213 Tribes also employ oodles of non-Indians 
who benefit from the
provision of tribal services; thus, there 
can be an obvious "nexus" between the
tribal taxes off reservation and tribal services.
The Supreme Court is not likely to btiy this line of reasoning; in 
fact, the
Supreme Court has held that the presumption 
is a tribe cannot tax non-Indians
operating on fee lands within the tribe's own 
reservation. The ability to
categorically tax anyone within the tribe's lands seems 
like a more obvious tribal
power than extending tribal tax power 
beyond reservation lands. Despite the bad
precedent, the Supreme Court's decisions 
in tribal tax cases have produced
211 Dispute Settlement System Training Module: 
Chapter 6, The Process-Stages in a Typical
WTO Dispute Settlement Case, 
WORLD TRADE ORG.
htp://www.woorgenglish/ape/spue/dissettlement 
cbt-e/c6slOpl e.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2020).
212 Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177, 
1199 (10th Cir. 2011) ("However, the
more important state service-and the one that primarily 
justifies the New Mexico taxes at issue
is the off-reservation infrastructure used to transport 
the oil and gas after it is severed."); see also
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 
189 (1989) (2T]he relevant services
provided by the State include those that are available 
to the lessees and the members of the Tribe
off the reservation as well as on it."); Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 157 (1980) ("The State also 
has a legitimate governmental interest in
raising revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest 
when the tax is directed at off-reservation
value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state 
services."); Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v.
Gerlach, 269 F. Supp. 3d 910, 931 (D.S.D. 2017) ("Although 
the proceeds of the use tax enter the
State's general fund, which is not earmarked for 
any expenditures in particular, the Tribe does
indeed benefit from off-reservation road maintenance 
and public safety services leading to the
Store, the licensure of some food vendors, as well 
as other services.").
213 Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 
125-29 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Califomnia v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 220 (1987).
214 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001).
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inconsistent results.2 15 Additionally, tribes are now performing significantly
more government functions than they were when many of the major tribal tax
cases were decided.2 16 This should boost tribes' chances at success in theSupreme Court, but greater tribal government capacity will almost certainly beinsufficient to convince the Court to bar state taxes.
Tribes have a stronger case if the off-reservation tax is limited
specifically to the tribes' citizens. Indians often have to leave their reservations
to obtain basic goods and find jobs because businesses are leery of operating inIndian country. The reason for the dearth of businesses in Indian country is notthe tribes' doing; rather, the federal government and states have rendered Indiancountry inhospitable to private enterprise.2 18 No business wants to pay state andtribal taxes, and without tax revenue, tribes have difficulty providing thegovernmental services and basic infrastructure that businesses need. On top ofthis, Indian country is the most densely-regulated region in the United States,219
and this means opening a business in Indian country can take over ten times aslong as opening a business outside.2 2 0 Most of these business-killing regulations
are federal and based upon antiquated ideologies.22 1 This regulatory maze putsIndian country at a massive competitive disadvantage when it comes to attracting
businesses as compared to states.
In addition to the rancid economic environment, many Indians resideoutside of Indian country because they were coerced into relocating from their-
215 Alexander, supra note 188, at 399 ("The Court's analysis fails to reconcile the oppositeoutcomes of Cotton Petroleum and Crow Tribe, and, indeed, reconciling these two outcomes wouldbe difficult.").
216 Washburn, supra note 68, at 201 ("More importantly, in place of federal programs andservices, the last fifty years have been characterized by the growth of federal contracting with tribesto perform federal trust functions.").
217 Gavin Clarkson & Alisha Murphy, Tribal Leakage: How the Curse of Trust Land ImpedesTribal Economic Self-Sustainability, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 177, 177-78 (2016) (noting Navajoand Crow Reservation residents drive long distances to reach off reservation Wal-Marts becauseno stores are on the reservations).
218 STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDETo INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 4 (3d. ed. 2002).
219 Id. ("No other ethnic or cultural group is so heavily regulated."); Felix S. Cohen, The ErosionofIndian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 352 (1953).220 Shawn E. Regan & Terry L. Anderson, The Energy Wealth ofIndian Nations, 3 LA. ST. U.J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 195, 208 (2014) ("On Indian lands, companies must go through fourfederal agencies and forty-nine regulatory or administrative steps to acquire a permit to drill,compared with only four steps when drilling off reservation."); Albuquerque Transcript, supranote 191, at 5 ("When they're drilling off reservation, it takes them about four months to get allthe permitting process off reservation. On reservation, it takes 31 months for no other reason thanit's our fault.").
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reservations.222 These are not removals done a century ago; rather, many 
people
who were removed from their tribe's reservation are still 
alive. Thousands of
Indians reside outside of Indian country because 
the federal government
relocated their families to major cities during the 1950s 
as part of the Indian
Relocation Program.
223 Then, between 25% and 35% of Indian children were
stolen from their parents and predominantly placed in 
white homes until 1978.
Hence, states are drawing Indians into their borders 
based upon artificial
competitive advantages over tribes.
State competitive advantages are infringing upon the right 
of reservation
Indians to make their own rules and be governed by 
them-the hallmark of
Indian self-governance.
225 Tribes face difficulty operating as self-sufficient
governments without tax revenue, and tribes 
have no tax revenue without private
sector jobs on their land.
226 States are luring Indians off the reservation with their
easy regulatory environments and comparative 
tax advantage. States should
not be allowed to seduce Indians to shop off the reservation 
by offering lower
tax rates than the tribe.
For example, a tribe opens a store on its reservation and 
assesses a tribal
tax of 10% on all goods sold at the store. State taxes do 
not apply to purchases
made by tribal citizens on their reservation, so tribal citizens 
have to pay the 10%
tax rate. If the state and county sales tax combine for a rate 
of 7%, tribal citizens
now have an incentive to shop off-reservation in order 
to evade the higher tribal
tax rate.
222 Profile: American Indian/Alaska Native, U.S. 
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF.
MINORITY HEALTH RESOURCE 
CTR.,
(ttpslsmtnorityhealth.hhs.sotoh/o7 e ewast visited Apr. 10, 2020)
("The 2010 Census reveals that 78 percent of the [American 
Indian and Alaska Native population]
live .. . on reservations or other trust lands.").
223 Indian Relocation Act of 1956, ch 930, § 1, 70 Stat. 986 (1956); amended 
Dec. 23, 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-230, § 1(a), 77 Stat. 471, codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.A. 
§ 309 (West 2020).;
see also Alexia Ferdndez Campbell, How America's Past Shapes Native 
Americans' Present,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlanltic.con/business/archive/
2 0l 6 /1 0/native-
americans-minneapolis/503441/.
224 Joaquin R. Gallegos & Kathryn E. Fort, Protecting 
the Public Health ofIndian Tribes: The
Indian Child Welfare Act, HARV. PUB. 
HEALTH REv. (2017),
htp//-vaardpublichealth eview.org/protectin-the-public-ealth-of-indian-tribes-Ithe oidinchil-wefar-ac/ (Studes emostrtedthat approximately 25-35 
percent of Indian children
were forcibly removed from their families, often unwarranted, 
and over 85 percent of Indian
children were placed in non-Indian homes.").
225 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
226 Taxing government-generated revenue does not add to 
tribal revenues.
227 For example, reservation land is often held in trust, and trust land is a 
massive obstacle to
economic development. Gavin Clarkson & Alisha Murphy, Tribal 
Leakage: How the Curse of
Trust Land Impedes Tribal Economic Self-Sustainability, 12 J.L. EcoN. 
& POL'Y 177, 179 (2016).
[Vol. 122IT,, D 17 T1117 W
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Citizens attempting to dodge lawful taxes is intolerable according to theSupreme Court, so states should be required to enforce tribal taxes in the sameway that tribes are required to enforce state taxes. Consequently, state businesses
can verify whether purchasers are Indian or not, collect taxes from Indians, andthen remit the taxes to the tribe. This is, after all, a "minimal burden" accordingto the Supreme Court.229 Plus, tribes have jurisdiction over their citizens evenwhen they are outside of the tribe's territory,230 so there is a sound legal basis forthe off-reservation tribal taxes. This may be overwhelming if retailers had toremit taxes to each of the 574231 federally recognized tribes. However, the burdenis analogous to that on tribes if retailers are only required to collect and remittaxes for tribes with reservations adjacent to their town.232
Authorizing tribal taxes of their citizens' off-reservation purchases is nota good solution to double taxation. It makes purchases more expensive forIndians who are already the nation's poorest group, and it complicates life foroff-reservation retailers. Although it is impractical and has undesirable results,unpracticality and undesirability have not stood in the way of states imposingtheir taxes on tribes. Allowing tribes to do the same to states is fair as it helpslevel the economic playing field between states and tribes by giving tribes sometax dollars to fund their government operations.
228 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980)("What the smokeshops offer these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely anexemption from state taxation."); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of FlatheadReservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) ("The State's requirement that the Indian tribal seller collecta tax validly imposed on non-Indians is a minimal burden designed to avoid the likelihood that inits absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawfultax.",).
229 Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 73 (1994) ("Inparticular, these cases have decided that States may impose on reservation retailers minimalburdens reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians.").
230 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911(a) (West 2020); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)("Thus it is an important aspect of this case that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessingattributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory . (citation omitted));Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 868 (6th Cir. 2016).
231 Tailyr Irvine, The Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians Celebrates Federal Recognition,HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.hen.org/issues/52.3/indigenous-affairs-the-
little-shell-tribe-of-chippewa-indians-celebrates-federal-recognition.
232 See Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. at 77; Confederated Tribes of the Colville IndianReservation, 447 U.S. at 134; Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. at 483.
2020]
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VI. CONCLUSION
The court in QCV was right about one thing: the tribe 
could not point to
213
a single modern era case supporting its position.23 
Sadly, the Supreme Court has
made it virtually impossible for tribes to create a 
tax base. The Supreme Court's
authorizing state taxation of Indian country 
violates the Constitution and
undermines tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's 
permitting
state taxes of tribal commerce contradicts the United States' Indian 
policy of
tribal self-determination. Until tribes are allowed 
the same taxing rights as other
governments, tribal self-government will 
be hobbled. Prohibiting state taxes of
Indian country will allow tribes to recruit businesses to their 
land, levy taxes, and
operate as the nations they are and always 
have been.
233 Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 
1063 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (excluding
its "failed Bracker preemption claim").
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